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Fighting for the Forests
Grassroots Resistance to Mining in Northern Ecuador
by
Glen David Kuecker
The history of a grassroots struggle against proposed mining projects in the
Ecuadorian community of Junín reveals the centrality to its development of a “colono
mentality” augmented by the conscientization of liberation theology. Links established
between local organizers and NGOs in Ecuador and elsewhere helped the community to
raise the costs of development sufficiently to drive the mining company away. A subse-
quent rise in the price of copper altered the comparative-advantage formula again, how-
ever, and a new mining company is seeking to win community members’ hearts and
minds. While a Gramscian war of position is appropriate under present circumstances,
it is highly vulnerable to capitalism’s capacity for survival.
Keywords: Ecuador, mining, social movements, globalization, environment
José Enríquez had an eventful start to his day on May 12, 1997. José was the
caretaker of a copper mining exploration camp near the Andean mountain
community of Junín, which is located in the Intag region of Imbabura Province,
northern Ecuador. He was alone at the camp, which normally hosted a group
of mining engineers from Bishi Metals, a subsidiary of the Mitsubishi
Corporation. The previous evening all of Junín’s 50 families had met with rep-
resentatives from Acción Ecológica (Ecology in Action), a nongovernmental
organization (NGO) based in Quito, and Defensa y Conservación Ecológica de
Intag (Ecological Defense and Conservation of Intag—DECOIN), a grassroots
ecological organization formed to resist mining in the region. The meeting had
concluded with the community determined to take dramatic action against
the company. Next morning, 87 people from Junín hiked up the 6.5-km moun-
tain trail to the camp, where they collected all of the property at the camp,
inventoried it, and packed it for the trip back down the mountain. They had
José sign the inventory, which included things like cups, plates, geological
equipment, rolls of wire, and an electrical generator. José went to García
Moreno, the first town of significance on the road to Apuela, to notify the
company and the government. A day passed as people from Junín, now num-
bering 200, moved the property down the mountain and awaited a response.
The next day, not having heard anything and according to plan, they burned
the mining camp to the ground. Before leaving, they nailed a simple wooden
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sign to a post. It read, “Not Another Step Forward for the Miners.” It was a
prophetic slogan: to date the people of Junín have proven victorious in keep-
ing mining out of their community (El Comercio, May 27, 1997).
According to Carlos Zorrilla, a 30-year Intag resident and DECOIN’s pres-
ident in 1997, “the case of Junín is a clear wake-up call to governments all over
the world, and to big mining companies in particular, that local populations
must not be ignored, and that their rights to decide their own future must
never be overlooked” (Drillbits and Tailings, 1997: 1). A decision by 200 people
to confront one of the largest corporations in the world is a story that attracts
our attention. The people of Junín, however, challenged more than Mitsubishi;
they also frustrated the plans of the Ecuadorian government and the World
Bank. When 200 people stop the neoliberal project in their corner of the world,
we might expect people to take notice. Their story of resistance, however,
remains widely unknown.
Junín’s story is a case study of grassroots resistance to neoliberalism, and it
highlights three main themes. First, it illustrates the core issue of who has the
power to decide. In this case, the people of Junín determined that it was their
right and not that of the World Bank, state technocrats, or corporations to
decide the fate of the forests. Second, it highlights the distinction between
what John Holloway calls “power over” and “power to” that is central to an
understanding of today’s social movements (2002: 22). In Junín, as in places
like Chiapas, highly marginalized communities seek empowerment, the abil-
ity “to do” instead of seeking dominion over others. Third, it provides an
example of how today’s social movements construct alternatives to neoliber-
alism. Confronted with the prospect of mining, the people of Junín were chal-
lenged to devise a replacement for it, an alternative development project that
was ecologically feasible and met the criteria of community empowerment.
Their resistance to mining has fostered an agrarian-based environmental ethic
that constitutes a radical challenge to neoliberalism, placing the idea of com-
munity above profit, production, and consumption. Taken together, these
themes show that community ultimately proves the key to resistance because
it is not reducible to the logic of free-market capitalism. The irreducibility of
community is the Achilles’ heel of today’s capitalism, because the neoliberal
paradigm fails to factor the power of community into the cost of production.
This essay first places the Junín case in the political and economic context of
mining in Ecuador and then explains how the community organized its resis-
tance. It concludes with an analysis of Junín as a social movement.
When asked why Ecuador needs mining, Ecuador’s under-secretary of
energy and mining, replied, “Ecuador has the moral obligation to conduct
mining…the world needs minerals. Ecuador has minerals. Ecuador has the
obligation to provide them.” It was a perfect statement of the neoliberal pro-
ject for Ecuador: it has the obligation to destroy its greatest asset, biodiversity,
in order to pay off its greatest liability, an unpayable foreign debt. The under-
secretary’s statements reflect policy makers’ thinking about Ecuador’s eco-
nomic problems, which are immense and potentially impossible to resolve.
Despite a high rate of increase in gross domestic product (GDP) growth dur-
ing the 1970s, when it peaked at 9.1 percent per year, Ecuador has faced steep
declines ever since. Average GDP dropped to 2.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6
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percent in the 1990s (World Bank, 2003: 1). In 1990, a decade before an eco-
nomic melt-down, the total payment made by Ecuador on its foreign debt was
10.5 percent of the GDP, a figure that has been reduced to 9 percent in 2002
through vigorous austerity programs. Ecuador is unquestionably a primary-
product exporter; in 2000 these products made up 90 percent of exports
(United Nations, 2002: 199). Export-dependent, Ecuador is highly vulnerable
to fluctuations in global supply and demand and experiences severe limits on
keeping capital within the country that make it dependent upon borrowing
from the developed world. A chronic inability to meet debt payments drives
the political economy (Gerlach, 2003).
When addressing Ecuador’s intractable economic problems, World Bank
analysts explicitly view mining as one path of development. They think that
private-sector development of mineral resources will stimulate economic
growth and call for legal and administrative reforms to encourage private
investment (Fox, Onorato, and Strongman, 1998). This thinking mirrors the
logic of the austerity programs promoted throughout Latin America by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in which loans were
made conditional upon a drastic reduction of state spending (Gerlach, 2003;
Green, 1995). In Ecuador, the World Bank advised downsizing government by
“transferring to the private sector many of the responsibilities currently under
public sector purview” (World Bank, 1994). These policies, however, failed
miserably, and Ecuador faced total economic collapse in 1999. In August it
failed to make the interest payments on US$6.5 billion in Brady Bonds and
then defaulted on them. To save itself, in January 2000 Ecuador dollarized its
economy and undertook ever more extreme austerity measures (World Bank,
2000; 2004). With dollarization, Ecuador became directly linked to the U.S.
economy. Moreover, it now has only two options available for getting US dol-
lars: borrowing and exporting at higher levels than before. Borrowing is pos-
sible only under strict IMF conditions, and therefore policy makers prefer
increasing exports of primary products. The Ecuadorian state has conse-
quently been very keen on pushing mining into new areas. Such places, unfor-
tunately, are often ecologically vulnerable rain and cloud forests.
A tiny group of Ecuadorians has power over the nation’s mining policy. It
determines policy to the exclusion of the communities in which mining takes
place and without input from Ecuador’s 12 million people. Under Minister of
Energy and Mines Pablo Terán’s direction, Ecuador encouraged rapid and
apparently unrestricted foreign development of the mining sector. In one
interview Terán boasted, “This is a very deregulated system, very hands-off
on the part of the state. The Ecuadorian government has turned into a facili-
tator rather than a policeman, as we used to be” (2001). Mining promotion fea-
tures legal reforms friendly to foreign capital and a slick advertising
campaign. According to the Ministry’s promotional material, “the Ecuadorian
government has made substantial efforts to improve the investment climate
for both domestic and foreign companies,” including “a complete overhaul of
Ecuador’s minerals administration system” (Mining Journal, 2001).
The reforms featured the “single title,” which replaced a system requiring
the holder to renew the title for each stage of the mining process. This mea-
sure undermined the state’s ability to regulate mining and hold title owners
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accountable and eliminated community input into the process. The single title
is valid for 30 years and can be revoked only for failure to pay fees. The
reforms also included “the complete abolition of royalties from mineral pro-
duction.” There is a US$100 application fee for a title and a fee of US$1 per
hectare (2.5 acres) until production starts; then the fee increases to US$16.
According to Terán, “You can now obtain a mining title in any region of
Ecuador in about two weeks—there’s no hassle, no red tape, nothing like that.
And soon you will be able to apply for a title over the Internet.” He continues,
“Once you have your title, you don’t have to report what you are doing, and
it is up to you what you do.” Lacking reporting mechanisms, a review process,
and community input, the new mining law was an excellent way for mining
companies to externalize the costs of development and production. Profoundly
undemocratic, these reforms provide an example of the way neoliberalism
steals the power to decide from communities and gives it to corporations.
Ecuadorian policy makers maintain that mining will bring prosperity to the
nation. “We also realize,” explains Terán, “the value that a successful mining
project will bring to Ecuador’s development.” He continues, “We would
rather that the company made a success of bringing a mine into production,
and benefit the communities in the area concerned” (Mining Journal, 2001).
Such prosperity is only the short-term boom of an export sector. Unlike agri-
cultural export production, the mineral export sector is finite. The potential
short-term gains are offset by long-term costs that Minister Terán does not
mention. The destruction of Intag’s biodiversity must be weighed against the
temporary jobs and infrastructure promised by mining. His “development-at-
any-cost” approach overlooks the externalized costs of pollution, environ-
mental destruction, community displacement, health problems, and social ills
such as prostitution and alcoholism (Evans, Goodman, and Lansbury, 2001:
xiii; Sampat, 2003).
The concept of comparative advantage drives the thinking of neoliberals like
Terán. Countries are expected to develop economic specialization where they
enjoy an “advantage.” Ecuador’s advantage is abundant natural resources and
ecological diversity. According to the neoliberal model, it should specialize in
raw-material export in exchange for commodities it does not produce. For
many, this approach is the sum of all logic, a beautiful paradigm that justifies
free-market economics. Comparative advantage, however, falsely assumes that
all countries are equal when exchanging their advantages. Obviously, equality
between Ecuador and the United States is an absurdity. Trading bananas, a
commodity with minimal value added, for automobiles, a commodity with con-
siderable value added, eventually results in trade deficit and chronic underde-
velopment of capital. In the case of mining, as Peter Colley (2001: 25–26) argues,
high technology and existing infrastructure encourage companies to invest in
the exploitation of existing mines, often in developed countries, instead of
launching new mines in places like Ecuador, where low technology, poor or
nonexistent infrastructure, unskilled labor, corruption, and political instability
significantly increase costs. Ecuador’s comparative advantage is not so much
raw materials as the ability to offer highly favorable terms to foreign investors.
Its reformed mining laws allow multinational companies to operate in ways
that are often illegal in their own countries. Its comparative advantage is in
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allowing multinationals to externalize the costs of production in Ecuador—costs
that are absorbed by Ecuadorian society while remaining out of sight to First
World consumers. Ecuadorians carry the expense while corporations profit; that
is the reality of comparative advantage.
One company that took comparative advantage of Ecuador’s reformed
mining laws was Mitsubishi. It arrived in Ecuador in July 1991, when the
Ecuadorian government reached an agreement with Japan to collaborate
on mining exploration. Japan turned to Bishi Metals to undertake explo-
ration along with the state-owned Corporación de Desarrollo e Investigación
Metalúrgico Minería (Metallurgical Mining Development and Research
Corporation—CODIGEM). Junín’s selection was made possible by the gov-
ernment Proyecto de Desarrollo Minero y Control Ambiental (Ecuadorian
Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance
Project—PRODEMINCA). Funding for PRODEMINCA came from a US$14
million World Bank loan and a US$8.7 million loan from the governments of
Britain and Sweden and from the Japanese government as part of the Bishi Metals
agreement. According to the Ministry of Energy and Mines, PRODEMINCA’s
main objective was to provide a detailed geological survey of the entire
country, the first ever conducted (2001a: 1). The survey was done between
1990 and 1992 and identified 20 percent of Ecuador’s surface as containing
mineral resources (David Kneas, interview, April 2002). With an estimated 72
million tons of copper, Junín showed immediate promise, but to extract this
mineral bonanza companies like Bishi Metals would need to build an ecolog-
ically destructive open-pit mine (Drillbits and Tailings, 1997: 1).
When the neoliberal project arrived in Intag, it came in the form of the geolo-
gists and engineers who conducted the PRODEMINCA surveys. Prior to their
arrival, neoliberalism had been defined by the near-total absence of the state and
its services, which compounded Intag’s marginalization within Ecuador. Deep
within the Andes, Intag is a very difficult place to reach. It is quicker to fly from
Quito to Houston than it is to travel from Quito to Junín. It is exceptionally diffi-
cult to build the basic infrastructure—roads, bridges, telephone, and electricity—
needed to integrate Intag and communities like Junín with the rest of Ecuador. In
addition, the heavy and prolonged rains reduce roads to quagmires passable
only on foot or, preferably, mule. Intag is still recovering infrastructure destroyed
during the last El Niño year (1997–1998), whose rains left 20,000 Ecuadorians
homeless and destroyed 1,300 miles of roads (Gerlach, 2003: 160). The historic
weakness of the Ecuadorian state augments geographic marginalization; the
long arm of the state has yet to reach Intag, leaving its population to a rustic exis-
tence that fosters strong community bonds for self-preservation. The majority of
the region’s inhabitants are colonos (colonists), both mestizos (persons of indige-
nous and European ancestry) and Afro-Ecuadorians. They migrated to Intag
seeking the independence and security of land acquired either by squatting or by
purchase. With the earliest colonists having settled no more than 100 years ago,
Intag’s distant relationship to the nation-state is also a consequence of the rela-
tive newness of its communities.
Like other Latin American social movements, Junín’s struggle against min-
ing is embedded in the political economy of the neoliberal state. As is shown
by William Robinson (2004), the role of the nation-state has recently undergone
Kuecker / FIGHTING FOR THE FORESTS 5
profound change. This change includes the disarticulation of the state from
society in its subservience to transnational elites, institutions, and corpora-
tions. In Ecuador an already weak and ineffective state became more so with
neoliberal economic reforms that reduced government spending by cutting
public-sector funding. These policies had the harmful impact of increasing
Ecuador’s need for social services precisely at a time when the state’s ability
to provide them was drastically restricted. Unable to address the deepening
social problems caused by its economic reforms, the neoliberal state failed to
help Ecuadorians as they descended ever deeper into poverty. Poverty has
increased from 34 percent in 1995 to 46 percent in 1998 and an alarming 69 per-
cent in 2000. The World Bank estimates that 88 percent of the rural population
lives in poverty, up from 54 percent in 1995 (World Bank, 2003: 19). In 1998 the
poorest 10 percent had only 0.9 percent of the national income while the rich-
est 10 percent enjoyed 41.6 percent. In 2000 17.7 percent of Ecuadorians earned
US$1 a day or less, while 40.8 percent existed on less than US$2. With a per
capita GDP at US $1,897, in 2002 Ecuador is one of the poorest Latin American
countries (United Nations, 2004). Communities that were already marginal-
ized such as Junín were pushed to the edge. Evidence of the precipice can be
found in migration statistics: of a population of 12 million, at least 1 million
have migrated to either Spain or the United States. Remittances rank as the
second-largest item in the gross national product, making Ecuador’s truest
comparative advantage the export of humans (de la Vega, 2004). In 2001 they
reached US $1.5 billion (World Bank, 2004: 13). Visit Intag and you will find
males in their twenties and thirties who have done their tour of duty in Spain
or the United States. Interviews with them reveal a harsh and bitter experience
of racism, exploitation, and alienation. Migration, however, is an age-old sur-
vival tactic for communities throughout Latin America. When faced with the
brutal realities of impoverishment and a debilitated state apparatus unable to
deliver basic services, communities organize for self-preservation. In the case
of Junín, marginalization was the political and economic context that stimu-
lated the consciousness formation necessary for organizing against mining.
Prior to the arrival of the mining company, a powerful social process was
under way. It combined the lived experiences and worldviews of the region’s
colonos with the empowering and politicized doctrine of liberation theology.
Together these created the core of the community’s resistance to mining.
When I asked community members to describe the colono mentality, the con-
sistent reply was “independent,” “hardworking,” and “honest.” They empha-
sized the centrality of land ownership, being one’s own boss, having a strong
family, and counting on members of the community. These are people who
know struggle. Many have literally carved a life out of the forests, which can
be unforgiving to human inhabitants. One community member, 56-year-old
Viktor Calvache (interview, Junín, August 12, 2004), explained, “Not everyone
can be a colonist . . . . It’s a rough, valiant life.…Your technology is the ax . . .
your consciousness is shaped by hard work.” They know the hardships of ill-
ness, child mortality, and a short life span. Diet is basic and not always secure.
These realities make people from communities like Junín bien bravo (defiantly
determined), a term often heard in Intag when people refer to the people of
Junín. Hard work and sacrifice instill a fierce determination to preserve their
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agrarian way of life. “We love our homes and we love our land,” says
Calvache; “we are organized to protect our community.” There is, of course, a
variant to the bien bravo colono identity. It is the colono who seeks quick
riches—the age-old dream of El Dorado. Colonos of this kind are willing to
sell land for profit or clear-cut trees for the market and are firmly supportive
of mining (Walter Garces, interview, Apulea, August 11, 2004).
“All of us are called to be leaders, because we are all humans. If we all think
this, then we can put ourselves in that position,” stated Padre Giovanni Paz at
a popular education meeting in Junín (interview, Junín, June 4, 2003). His
introduction of liberation theology was central to the environmental awaken-
ing throughout Intag. During the 1990s he organized communities for the res-
olution of problems arising from marginalization, and his efforts led to
grassroots projects of environmental and economic diversification. Liberation
theology laid the groundwork for grassroots resistance by educating commu-
nity members to be leaders, to see themselves as humans with full rights as cit-
izens, and to organize for the improvement of the community. In awakening
the communities, liberation theology assisted the process of conscientization,
in which critical self-reflection leads to analysis of the relations of power; this
is an awareness that was lacking in the colono mentality but necessary for the
resistance movement to form. Early in the process, Padre Giovanni worked
with Carlos Zorrilla, a Cuban national who grew up in the United States and
arrived in Intag in the 1970s. Carlos owns an eco-preserve, La Florida, which
is a model for sustainable-development projects alternative to lumber pro-
duction and mining (Carlos Zorrilla, interview, La Florida, August, 2004).
Carlos and the padre collaborated on environmental education projects for the
region’s youth. Their work provided an ecological framework for the colono
mentality’s agrarianism, resulting in a local ethic that linked protecting the
environment to agrarian life. A folk environmentalism was firmly in place
when the mining company arrived.
When state and corporate engineers and geologists first appeared in Intag,
they immediately raised concern among locals. People had learned to distin-
guish between outsiders like Paz and Zorrilla, who had lived, worked, orga-
nized, and socialized among them for years, and newly arrived outsiders,
especially those who came to inspect their lands. The presence of these pro-
fessionals led community members to research the implications of mining and
investigate the legacy of mining in other parts of the world. This research
revealed a disturbing record of environmental destruction, deepening
poverty, and social disintegration. Alarmed, they formed DECOIN in 1995,
and it has been in the eye of the storm ever since. DECOIN connected Intag
with the emerging antiglobalization movement by establishing links with
environmental organizations that provided information, training, money, and
solidarity. Of special importance was Quito-based Acción Ecológica, which
had experience in supporting community struggles against state and corpo-
rate raiders of the environment. Acción Ecológica helped develop interna-
tional solidarity with the communities’ aims. As has been demonstrated by
Keck and Sikkink (1998), international advocacy networks assist grassroots
groups in framing issues for campaigns. One such organization is the Sloth
Club, a Japanese NGO that promotes permaculture, alternative energy
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sources, renewable resources, and ecotourism. It joined forces with DECOIN
in 1996 in order to implement alternative development throughout Intag. It
also provided DECOIN with an international connection that made possible
the movement’s first letter-writing campaign, designed to put pressure on
Mitsubishi and the state to respect local voices in opposition to mining.
Along with the NGOs, community members made valuable contributions.
Mary Ellen Fieweger, for example, played a critical role in a study of mining
companies that resulted in the publication of a history of mining (Fieweger,
1998). An organic intellectual, Fieweger offers the movement a lifetime of orga-
nizing experience, a deep knowledge of Ecuadorian history, and a special facil-
ity for empowering others. She established a community newspaper, Periódico
Intag, to address the need for communication among geographically separated
communities. The newspaper is a model of popular education, serving as a
vehicle for teaching computer skills, the basics of journalism, and ways to think
about the world. It maintains an antimining editorial position, reports on alter-
native development projects, and functions as the newspaper of record in the
region, which is especially important considering the disinformation campaigns
of those who favor mining (Mary Ellen Fieweger, interview, La Florida, August
13, 2004). The newspaper’s success is best measured by the attacks it endures
from mining interests, especially an effort by Ascendant Exploration to sue it for
libel (<B>PLS PROVIDE REFERENCE<D>Periódico Intag, October 2004).
At first, community members were favorably impressed by the prospect of
mining. This attitude was a result of the effort of the mining company to win
their “hearts and minds.” Multinational mining companies, as Al Gedicks
(2001: 159–178) shows, have faced such fierce grassroots resistance that they
prepare locals for mining with propaganda and services and attack the anti-
mining arguments of the ecologists. Mining companies tell people that they
will all get jobs, share royalties, and have roads, telephones, health clinics with
doctors, and schools as rewards for their support. For marginalized people,
promises of streets paved with gold are very appealing, especially given the
get-rich-quick mentality of some colonos.
DECOIN understood that it had to counter the mining company’s commu-
nity relations campaign. With Acción Ecológica it developed popular educa-
tion workshops about the disadvantages and dangers of mining. The aim was
to create a context for experiential learning by placing people in situations in
which the convergence of reflection and experience leads to individual trans-
formations of consciousness and action. The vehicle for praxis in this case was
a jointly sponsored trip to Peru in 1996 that introduced community members
to the negative ecological and community impact of an operating copper
mine. As a result of these efforts, peoples’ attitudes toward mining became
increasingly negative. To build upon its successes, DECOIN started shade-
grown organic coffee projects as an example of sustainable development alter-
native to mining (Carlos Zorrilla, interview, La Florida, March 2002).
The movement’s turning point came in 1997, when DECOIN’s research dis-
covered an environmental impact study for the proposed copper mine. The
study had been commissioned by Bishi Metals as part of the process of gain-
ing concessions but never shared with the communities. The study presented
a gloomy forecast of widespread destruction. The open-pit mine was projected
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to bring extensive deforestation that was expected to lead to desertification. In
addition, it would deposit tons of waste minerals; its heavy metals would pol-
lute the surrounding environment. Rivers would also be contaminated with
mercury and cyanide, which would pollute drinking water, threaten aquatic
life, and present health risks to persons bathing or washing clothes in the
water. The report outlined how Cotacachi-Cayapas National Park would be
threatened by the project. More ominous, it estimated that 100 families would
be displaced by the mine, which would require the flooding of a populated
valley for its waste disposal (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 1996).
Community leaders went from house to house sharing the study’s findings
with families, taking the time for discussion and reflection on what it meant
for their lives.
The environmental impact study greatly increased antimining sentiment.
The threat of relocation was a direct attack upon the colono mentality and stim-
ulated the bien bravo attitude of defending community. It was clear to people
that state officials and mining company representatives had not been forth-
coming about the negatives of mining. They had offended one of the most basic
colono values—honor and integrity. Local values were further affronted when
government officials and company representatives failed to respond to
repeated requests for meetings; the silence highlighted the way neoliberalism
marginalizes communities like Junín. After the third snub, community members
took the bien bravo action of torching Bishi Metal’s mining camp.
DECOIN also challenged the World Bank. As we have seen, it provided the
funds and conceptualization for PRODEMINCA, which amounted to “a com-
plete overhaul of the minerals sector administration system and the institutions
involved” (Ministry of Energy and Mining, 2001b: 10). In 1999, however,
DECOIN threw a wrench into the World Bank’s plans. It initiated a claim
against PRODEMINCA, using an appeals process that was part of the bank’s
mechanism for development programs, for failing to conduct an environmental
impact study as the bank required. In a victory for the local ecologists, the bank
ruled in DECOIN’s favor in February 2001: “Management was in apparent vio-
lation of certain provisions of the policies and procedures on Environmental
Assessment . . . relating to processing, geographical scope, baseline data, and
concerning consultation during preparation” (World Bank Inspection Panel,
2001). The victory was perhaps only symbolic. As Rich (1994) demonstrates, the
World Bank’s appeals mechanism and policy oversight often divert attention
from the shortcomings of its development programs. In this case, the bank made
the minerals survey available to interested developers, saving them the cost of
doing their own surveys.
Junín’s victory over Mitsubishi and the World Bank is testimony to the abil-
ity of grassroots organizations to alter structures of power. Key to shifting the
terrain is the building of national and international networks of solidarity on
which locals can depend. The struggle, however, goes deeper than driving
companies like Mitsubishi out of places like Junín. Resistance also requires
implementing alternatives to corporate globalization. Groups like DECOIN
understood this crucial element and proactively worked to implement their
vision of a world without mining. To succeed, the communities of the region
had to be “cultural creatives.” As David Korten explains, cultural creatives
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“have a strong commitment to family, community, the environment, interna-
tionalism, and feminism. They have a well-developed social consciousness
and are optimistic” (1999: 215–216). Cultural creatives are the antithesis of cor-
porate globalization, the concentration of wealth and power by a few individ-
uals, companies, governments, and global institutions.
Intag’s cultural creatives integrate economic activities with the environ-
ment in a sustainable fashion. Communities have developed alternative
economies with subsistence farming, shade-grown coffee production, sugar
collectives, fish farming, and eco-tourism. These projects typically have sup-
port from NGOs, which provide funding as well as technical support. Locals
have also sought financial aid to purchase land to be added to eco-preserves
that are “no-go zones” for lumbering or mining. In promoting these alterna-
tives, community members have forged a strong alliance with the indigenous
mayor of Cotacatchi County, Auki Tituaña, one of the leading figures in
Ecuador’s indigenous political party, Pachakutik. With 25 percent of the pop-
ulation, Ecuador’s indigenous people have combined formal politics with
deeply rooted cultural resistance in becoming strong national political actors.
Although they won only 6 seats in the national election in 2002, they have
been key players in displacing two presidents in the past decade. Known for
honesty in government and strident opposition to neoliberalism, Pachakutik
was well positioned to help Intag communities with the struggle against min-
ing. Tituaña’s formal support provided legitimacy, leverage, and national
exposure to the local struggle. He worked with DECOIN in making Cotacatchi
County an ecocantón, in which mining is banned and alternative, environmen-
tally sustainable projects are promoted (Sheehan, 2003: 144; Carlos Zorrilla,
interview, La Florida, March 2002).
These projects are a key component of Intag’s success. They demonstrate to
locals that other paths are possible and that, despite what state and corporate
officials say, they can live an agrarian life without mining. This foundation
provides community members with the social fabric, organizational experi-
ence, consciousness, and commitment to resist mining. The popular education
tactics emphasize community and horizontally extend the decision-making
process. Community members who have learned about shade-grown coffee or
running a newspaper become teachers and pass along their knowledge to oth-
ers, extending empowerment throughout the commons. In the process people
become empowered, fully actualized, and more invested in a world without
mining, and they learn to work together and become skilled in consensus-
driven decision making. They build momentum with each project and gain
confidence in their abilities.
Mining companies, according to the chief executive officer of Rio Tinto Zinc
(RTZ), one of the world’s largest mining corporations, “are being naive about
how easy it is to operate in someone else’s back yard. We . . .see problems vir-
tually everywhere” (Moody, 2001: vii). When RTZ evaluates potential mines,
it is fully aware of how grassroots organizations like DECOIN operate. Roger
Moody, founder of Minewatch, points out that multinational corporations are
increasingly under attack by a global network of environmental activists
(2001: vi–vii). The efforts of environmental groups like the Sloth Club and
Acción Ecológica, in solidarity with local, grassroots organizations like
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DECOIN, have increased the cost of operations for the multinationals.
Community resistance tips the balance of comparative advantage by adding
negative factors to the cost of production, which includes not only having to
abide by environmental regulations that may call for expensive technologies,
machinery, and skilled labor but also maintaining a favorable corporate
image. Gedicks (2001) shows that corporations spend millions of dollars on
advertising, funding NGOs that disseminate propaganda, and supporting
academics who advocate underregulated or unregulated mining. Other costs
include extra staff required to handle community resistance, lawyers and lob-
byists, and payments to corrupt officials or buy off recalcitrant communities.
When such costs go up, the multinationals often leave. The cost threshold for
Mitsubishi was crossed with the burning of its camp.
Unfortunately for the local communities, the macro-structural factors of
comparative advantage subsequently tipped against them. In the past five
years the world price of copper has skyrocketed because of the dramatic jump
in demand caused by China’s construction boom (Kharas, 2005), and the
higher price has overwhelmed the previously prohibitive cost of mining in
Junín. DECOIN and the local bien bravos again have their backs against the
wall as they confront a new mining company, Ascendant Exploration. It is a
speculator in mining properties. Its goal is to secure title to the lands and gov-
ernment concessions in Junín and then sell them to a major mining company
that has the capital to develop them. The cost is estimated at US$1 billion.
Ascendant has to ensure that the communities to be affected are in support of
mining because no major company will invest a billion dollars in a project that
has a history of organized resistance. To sell, Ascendant needs to eliminate the
grassroots resistance to mining, and therefore it has launched an aggressive
campaign against it.
Ascendant’s efforts have all of the features of low-intensity conflict
employed by Latin American states to crush grassroots opposition. It exploits
the internal divisions among colonos by attacking the environmentalists and
supporting those who seek quick riches through mining. The company offers
generous perks to those who work with them by providing the infrastructure
and resources that the state is unable to deliver. Roads, bridges, schools, and
health clinics have all been built as tools for winning local hearts and minds.
An extensive propaganda campaign is under way. Paid informants ride on
buses and talk loudly enough for many to hear about the great things mining
would bring to Intag if it were not for organizations like DECOIN. The
company provides free medical services in which the doctors tout the benefits
of mining and plant lies about the leaders of the opposition. It distributes
Christmas presents to children in a shameless effort to gain favor. In short, it
exploits people’s poverty to sell its project.
The campaign also includes intimidation, such as the disruption of e-mail,
the stealing of regular mail, death threats, and a million-dollar libel suit
against Periódico Intag. A former Ecuadorian general, César Villacís, once in
charge of Ecuador’s secret police, is the member of Ascendant’s board of
directors responsible for community relations. He makes frequent appear-
ances at community meetings and makes it clear that the Ecuadorian military
supports mining in Junín. During meetings in the summer and fall of 2004,
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pro-mining people physically confronted those in opposition, pushing some,
destroying video equipment, and brandishing pistols. With millions of dollars
on the line, it is only a matter of time before Ascendant’s tactics of low-intensity
conflict are transformed into open violence.
This case of grassroots resistance to mining in Ecuador illustrates the
importance of community in the analysis of social movements in Latin
America today. Capitalism is a ruthless mechanism of social, political, and
economic exclusion, one that destroys the social fabric and effective citizen-
ship. People are not, however, passive recipients of this assault. They fight
back. The bien bravos of Junín are the resisters, organizers, activists, and
organic intellectuals who are working to reconstitute community. Through
their organizing, they are constructing a new form of citizenship from the bot-
tom up. This citizenship is opposed to the market-based citizenship promoted
by neoliberalism. These competing constructs of citizenship are central to an
understanding of the tension between corporate globalization and new social
movements throughout Latin America. While social movements defined by
concepts of autonomy, empowerment, and citizenship do not aim to take state
power and constitute significant departures from past revolutionary ones,
they are no less revolutionary in their style, substance, and actualization. They
constitute a radical challenge to the capitalist system as currently constituted,
but they do not necessarily represent a challenge to capitalism itself.
One key area of debate in the social movement literature concerns the ques-
tion whether today’s resistance constitutes a departure from the “new social
movements” of the 1980s (Kuecker, 2004). The Junín case is clearly an agrarian-
based social-justice movement of resistance to the marginalization of neolib-
eralism. Its environmental aspects share tendencies with the environmentalism
of the new social movements, especially their “not in my backyard” feature.
In defending their agrarian way of life, the people of Junín effectively relocate
mining to other parts of the world where the costs of environmental destruc-
tion are lower because of lack of community resistance. Yet, Junín does repre-
sent a significant break with the new social movements in the need to
construct an alternative to mining and the harshness of the neoliberal order.
While many new social movements lack a critique of capitalism, the move-
ment in Junín identifies a particular form of capitalism—neoliberalism—as
the cause of its problems, but it is not necessarily opposed to capitalism.
What is clear from the Junín case is that neoliberalism offers a new context
for social actors. It is defined by the transnationalization of sovereignty and
power that concentrates them in the hands of elites, corporations, and institu-
tions. In confronting this transnational trinity marginalized people on the
local level devise new strategies to contend with the problems caused by
neoliberalism. These strategies include new modes of organizing that empha-
size empowerment and horizontal decision-making processes that stand in
strong contrast to neoliberalism’s authoritarianism. Similar developments
throughout Latin America constitute a sharp departure from the new social
movements that planted the seeds for them (Kuecker, 2004).
The new modes of organizing include an important role for civil society,
especially NGOs. The formation of civil society was a significant by-product
of the new social movements of the 1980s, and its maturation as an important
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actor is a defining feature of today’s resistance. In the case of Junín, the grass-
roots formation of DECOIN and the support of Acción Ecológica and interna-
tional NGOs played crucial roles in the development of the resistance to
mining. The distinction from new social movements of the 1980s lies in the
way civil society changes the relations of power. The involvement of civil
society in solidarity with actors at the grass roots can block or frustrate the
designs of elites, corporations, nation-states, and global institutions, altering
the comparative advantage formula by increasing costs.
Students of today’s social movements confront the troubling issue of eval-
uating the effectiveness of tactics and strategies. Can these movements pro-
duce change without taking power? In Junín, constructing alternatives to
neoliberalism is not criticizing capitalism and the structures of power it pro-
duces. The liberation theology effort at empowerment is not necessarily an
attack on capitalism. While in radical opposition to neoliberalism, the move-
ment in Junín is fundamentally reformist. Community consciousness is aimed
at altering relations of power as against their overthrow. Yet, a Gramscian war
of position, in which social actors are better off transforming structures of
power when they are not in a position to take state power, is highly appropri-
ate at this juncture in the history of the movement. It is, however, highly vul-
nerable to the capacity of capitalism for survival. Junín can drive Mitsubishi
out, but that is not a victory over capitalism. As the price of copper goes up,
the comparative-advantage formula restores a favorable cost-benefit scenario
that negates the negatives of organized community. Until it dies or is over-
thrown, capitalism ultimately prevails.
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